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By the publication of Infinite Jest in 1996, it had long been David Foster Wallace's ambition to 
move beyond the now “critical and destructive” (1993, 183) postmodern irony that he claimed 
introduced “sarcasm, cynicism, a manic ennui, suspicion of all authority, suspicion of all constraints
on conduct” into literature and culture (McCaffery 1993, 147). With the posthumous publication of 
The Pale King, scholars can now begin to appraise Wallace's twenty-first century writing against 
that ambition in contrast to most accounts of Infinite Jest as a derailed, failed attempt. One of the 
redemptive tactics that is and surely will continue to be applied, is to classify Infinite Jest as a thrust
at, and The Pale King as an exemplar of, the post-postmodern.
[SLIDE]
Meanwhile, even a cursory glance at the twenty-first century fiction of Thomas Pynchon, the most 
frequently named influence upon Wallace, appears to reveal a similar shift. Both Against the Day 
and Inherent Vice seem to continue “the process of undercutting our ontological assumptions” 
through the metafictive devices and tropes of indeterminacy exemplified in V., The Crying of Lot 49
and Gravity's Rainbow, but have also shifted to a mode of new sincerity; or as Kathryn Hume puts 
it: a “new departure”  (Hume 2007, 163).
[SLIDE]
In this paper I want to  train a harsh critical gaze upon an emergent strain of
post-postmodernism that purports to rethink these issues: “metamodernism”.
Simultaneously, I  want  to  amalgamate  Walllace's and Pynchon's often
assumed, but never fully formulated, points of convergence while disturbing
the concept of a millennial turning point for a revived, ethically-viable fiction.
While Wallace worked to demonstrate “that cynicism and naievety are mutually
compatible”  (Boswell 2003) –  an aim accurately described by
“metamodernism” –  much of Pynchon's fiction can also be so described; it
appears that metamodernism's Vice could  be  Inherent within postmodern
literature. Indeed, although it is accurate to describe both of these writers as
metamodern,  as a form of post-postmodernism,  metamodernism cannot be
used as a temporal specifier, but rather as an identifier of  important shared
thematic attributes; those aspects that point toward a regulative utopianism.
[SLIDE]
Let me begin by talking, briefly, about “metamodernism”. Metamodernism is a
term  coined  by  Timotheus  Vermeulen  and  Robin  van  den  Akker  in  which
metaxy, or between-ness, is posited as the central component. Although there
are many nuances to their definition, it is profitable to outline several of the key
aspects before moving to examine how these could be perceived as emerging
in Pynchon's and Wallace's fiction around 2000. [SLIDE] Firstly, Vermeulen and
van  den  Akker's  theorisation  of  metamodernism  is  characterised  by  an
oscillation between “postmodern irony (encompassing nihilism, sarcasm, and
the distrust and deconstruction of grand narratives, the singular and the truth)
and  modern  enthusiasm  (encompassing  everything  from  utopism  to  the
unconditional belief in Reason) ” (Vermeulen and van den Akker 2010). [SLIDE]
Secondly,  they  claim  a  shift  from  a  “positive”  (Hegelian),  to  “negative”
(Kantian) idealism and theory of history, “most appropriately summarized as
‘as-if’ thinking”. Indeed, they posit an ontology of regulative ideas, of Beckett-
esque compulsion to continue regardless: “The current, metamodern discourse
also acknowledges that history’s purpose will never be fulfilled because it does
not exist. Critically, however, it nevertheless takes toward it as if it does exist.
Inspired  by  a  modern  naïveté  yet  informed  by  postmodern  skepticism,  the
metamodern discourse consciously commits itself to an impossible possibility”.
[SLIDE] Finally, they conclude that “both the metamodern epistemology (as if)
and its  ontology (between)  should  thus be conceived of  as a 'both-neither'
dynamic. They are each at once modern and postmodern and neither of them.
One should be careful not to think of this oscillation as a balance however;
rather,  it  is  a pendulum swinging between 2,  3,  5,  10,  innumerable poles.”
Metamodernism is a mode of constellatory thinking, it is a movement between
contradictory  elements  that,  when  brought  together  in  configuration,  even
temporal configuration, light up with the Benjaminian flash of illumination.
[SLIDE]
While Vermeulen and van den Akker's paradigm has already found its way as far afield as 
psychoanalytic discussion of transgender subjectivity (Hansbury 2011, 219), there are many serious 
failings in their model which must be pre-emptively highlighted. Particularly problematic is the 
historical and philosophical lineage within which they situate their discourse. For instance, their 
direct citation of Kant is a poor, flawed choice: “Indeed, Kant himself adopts the as-if terminology 
when he writes '[e]ach . . . people, as if following some guiding thread, go toward a natural but to 
each of them unknown goal'. That is to say, humankind, a people, are not really going toward a 
natural but unknown goal, but they pretend they do so that they progress morally as well as 
politically”. It is clear that Kant's “as if” does no such thing but rather, in this translation, deploys a 
second conditional with the past continuous subjunctive to indicate that it is the “guiding thread” 
which is hypothetical, as mirrored in the original German (“als an einem Leitfaden”) and other 
translations (“as by a guiding thread” (Kant 2009, 10)). The gloss they put on this sentence is in 
contradiction to its meaning; for the individual, actions appear free, chaotic and unpredictable, 
whereas when considered en masse, human behaviour conforms to overarching predictable laws: 
“the annular tables [...] prove that they occur according to laws” for “[a]ll natural capacities of a 
creature are destined to evolve completely to their natural end” (Kant 1963, 11-12). As Henry E. 
Allison puts it, in this piece, at least, Kant's history does not play a “regulative role” as the “Idea” 
here is theoretical, rather than transcendental (2009, 24). Metamodernism, if aligned with Kant's 
grand narrative, would not seek “forever for a truth that it never expects to find,” (Vermeulen and 
van den Akker 2010) but would rather abandon the search, only to find the truth in which it 
disbelieves regardless.
[SLIDE]
 Vermeulen and van den Akker also inflate the novelty of their work: “[i]t is somewhat 
surprising that we appear to be among the first academics to discern in contemporary arts a 
sensibility akin to Romanticism”. This is incorrect; Thomas Pynchon identifies himself in his early 
phase “as one who has dabbled for short spans of time with a contemporary Romantic view, only to 
swing back […] to a 'classical' outlook” (Weisenburger 1990, 696) and this has been seen in critical 
work even before Vineland (Black 1980, 248; Chambers 1996, 21). As metamodernism claims to 
juxtapose elements of the postmodern alongside the modern, swinging, like Pynchon, from one to 
the other in the epistemic and ontological regions respectively, a neo-romantic trend is documented 
and unsurprising.
Finally,  concern  should  also  be  raised  by  the  extra-textual  work
surrounding metamodernism, with the authors running a blog (Vermeulen and
van den Akker 2011) and Twitter account (@metamodernism) focusing upon,
and monitoring usage of, the terminology, which they seem to be attempting to
shoehorn into academic discourse. This could be indicative of some manner of
Sokal-esque affair; a social experiment in its own right to ascertain how far a
neologism of questionable background will  travel.  Given this aspect and the
fact that metamodernism is clearly a flawed theorisation, why should it still be
considered?
[SLIDE]
One of the key problems with Brian McHale's  formulation of  a shift  in
dominant  towards the  ontological  in  postmodern fiction  is  that  in  a  setting
deliberately posited outside – as “a” universe in McHale's terms – and fixated
upon notions of representation, works tend towards a formulation of apathy. It
becomes very difficult to regain, in this mode of absolute other-worldliness, any
positivity because, while Against the Day, The Pale King, Gravity's Rainbow and
Infinite Jest all deploy anachronistic and heterotopic dislocation, it would only
be through the reinsertion of a naive enthusiasm that a pragmatic-idealistic
u-/dsy- topianism could be trained back upon the contemporary experienced
topos.
This is where metamodernism might hold potential, for all its flaws, which I will
explore further by looking at the various instances in Pynchon's and Wallace's
fictions. By splitting epistemology and ontology (in a more traditional sense) as
an oscillation  across  the  two categories,  instead  of  viewing  this  alterity  as
irreconcilable it can become, as the pre-release blurb to Against the Day puts
it, “not the world,” but “what the world might be with a minor adjustment or
two”.  To clarify,  then: in  metamodernism, the epistemology is  an oscillation
“between  naivete  and  knowingness  [...]  purity  and  ambiguity,”  while  the
ontology moves “between hope and melancholy, empathy and apathy, unity
and plurality, totality and fragmentation”.
From this, the metamodern ontology in literature (hope, melancholy, empathy, apathy, unity, 
plurality, totality and fragmentation) can be thematically reduced to the oscillation of eternity 
against time and reflexive stasis against utopia, with the epistemological “as-if” drive located in the 
movement between each pole.
[SLIDE]
Reflexive stasis in postmodern fiction comes about through metafictive
fixation on representation leading to infinite recursion, perhaps best seen in
Barth's  Lost in the Funhouse,  which leads to the cynicism of which Wallace
writes. With this in mind, perhaps the most surprising element in The Pale King
is the introduction of a meta-reflexive authorial character, introduced with a
faux-innocent “right here is me as a real person, David Wallace” (2011, 66).
This fits well with McHale's ontological premise.
[SLIDE]
Regardless of the insincerity of the author's claim to “find these sorts of cute, self-referential 
paradoxes irksome,” (Wallace 2011, 67) the metafictionally induced reflexive stasis of this section 
and its continuation in §24, is beyond dispute, featuring cyclical reference to the book's copyright 
disclaimer, re-introduction of footnotes, discussion of naivety (2011, 77) and paranoid allegations of
conspiracy (2011, 83,85). Further to this, portions of §22, the narrative of 'Irrelevant' Chris Fogle 
(2011, 257), are almost direct invocations of Wallace's “E Unibus Pluram” with classes wherein 
“nothing meant anything, that everything was abstract and endlessly interpretable” (2011, 155) 
before a transition to the revelation of a hidden substratum through a Jesuit figure (2011, 216-233), 
a key signifier of postmodern paranoia in both Pynchon and DeLillo (Ostrowski 2002). What is 
perhaps less obvious, however, is the embedded, allusive context of other, supposedly “straight” 
passages of the novel. Consider §8 which features the history of Toni Ware. At first glance this 
appears to be the classic sincerity with which Wallace is credited; the episode tackles serious 
subjects, including sexual assault, in a non-ironic, head-on and sympathetic fashion while avoiding 
condescension. However, the section begins with an extremely long sentence, the first portion of 
which reads:
Under the sign erected every May above the outer highway reading IT'S SPRING, 
THINK FARM SAFETY and through the north ingress with its own defaced name and 
signs addressed to soliciting and speed and universal glyph for children at play and 
down the black-top's gauntlet of double-wide showpieces past the rottweiler humping 
nothing in crazed spasms at chain's end and the sound of frying through the kitchenette 
window of the trailer at the hairpin right and then hard left along the length of a speed 
bump into the dense copse (2011, 53)
This structure of “throughness” movement, itself implying positive progression, time's forward 
movement, mediated by locative prepositions relational to various objects, had also appeared in the 
first episode of the novel:
Past the flannel plains and blacktop graphs and skylines of  canted
rust, and past the tobacco-brown river overhung with weeping trees
and coins of sunlight through them on the water downriver, to the
place beyond the windbreak (2011, 3)
There are two points of significance to this syntax, both of which frame the later sincerity in terms 
of a flawed metafictive quest. The first is that the opening section ends with an invitation to 
interpret the interminable chain of signifiers across the landscape of America: “[r]ead these,” (2011,
4) which must necessarily be mirrored when this structure recurs, particularly as Toni Ware is 
described as one who “made it her business to read signs” (2011, 58), an “incredibly obvious double
entendre” (2011, 163). The second, further demonstrating the ways in which The Pale King remains
laced with subdermal traces of agnosis and reflexivity, lies in the syntactic allusion of this passage 
to the opening of Pynchon's The Crying of Lot 49. This work – of which Wallace was acutely aware 
(Wallace 1993, 45) – could be called the ultimate postmodern anti-quest narrative and the structural 
resonance is striking:
[SLIDE]
Through the rest of the afternoon, through her trip to the market in
downtown Kinneret-Among-The-Pines to buy ricotta and listen to the
Muzak (today she came through the bead-curtained entrance around
bar 4 of the Fort Wayne Settecento Ensemble's variorum recording of
the Vivaldi Kazoo Concerto, Boyd Beaver, soloist); then through the
sunned gathering  of  her  marjoram and sweet  basil  from the herb
garden, reading of book reviews in the latest Scientific American [...]
(Pynchon 1996, 6)
Clearly, Wallace is structurally invoking the metafictional tradition in his
twenty-first-century work. For reasons of time, you're going to just have to
take my word  for  it  that  Pynchon  has  also  continued  his  metafictional
tropes into the 21st century, albeit perhaps somewhat softened when he
writes about tatzelwurms, in  Against the Day, that “[i]t is comforting to
imagine this as an outward and visible manifestation of something else
[...] but sometimes a Tatzelwurm is only a Tatzelwurm”.
However, the direction in which I want to now head for the final section of
this paper is to examine how, in many senses, the postmodern fiction that
preceded this later batch actually contains all the same ethical seeds.
[SLIDE]
Although  Pynchon's  most  lauded  work  is  known  for  its  schemas  of
indeterminacy and cynicism, Gravity's Rainbow has a deeply ethical core
of revealing the transatlantic transference of power post world war 2. It
also, though, has a personal narrative of redemption hidden among the
disintegrating subjects and epistemological play.
Vaslav Tchitcherine is first introduced when Slothrop is in Nordhausen, the site of the Dora 
concentration camp, at the start of part three, “In the Zone”. Aptly for the setting, Tchitcherine is 
presented in the context of slavery, albeit metaphorically, through Geli Tripping, who, “[i]n a way,” 
“belongs to” Tchitcherine (1995, 290) and, before long, Slothrop has mentally built him into a 
caricature of aggression: “Tchitcherine comes roaring through the window, a Nagant blazing in his 
fist. Tchitcherine lands in a parachute and fells Slothrop with one judo chop. Tchitcherine drives a 
Stalin tank right into the room, and blasts Slothrop with a 76 mm shell” (1995, 293). This version of
Tchitcherine as overly stylized aggressor is enhanced when it is revealed that he is on a mission to 
track down and kill Enzian who, in the very best tradition of track down and kill narratives, is his 
“half-brother” (1995, 329). The reason for this aggression “isn’t politics or fuck-your-buddy, it’s 
old-time, pure, personal hate” (1995, 331), the emphasis on the a-temporal historicity (“old time”) 
of which, even if not the motive element, invokes a grandiose series of mythico-cultural and 
allegorical fratricides including Cain and Abel, Romulus and Remus, Osiris and Set, Medea and 
Absyrtus, Eteocles and Polynices, Claudius and King Hamlet, Sir Balin and Sir Balan and, in more 
recent fiction, Faulkner's Absalom, Absalom! This build-up continues over the course of four 
hundred pages in which Tchitcherine is described as a “mad scavenger” possessed of “steel teeth” 
with a “compulsive [...] need to annihilate,”  (1995, 337-338) a “suicidal maniac,” (1995, 345) 
“[r]eckless,” (1995, 347) responsible for Slothrop's interrogation in the “Sodium Amytal session,” 
(1995, 390) with his secret “vendetta” (1995, 564) amid revelations of “the shape of defeat, of 
operational death,” (1995, 566) while he seeks “comfort in the dialectical ballet of force, 
counterforce, collision, and new order ” (1995, 704).
[SLIDE]
Tchitcherine's  personal  redemption  represents  an  untempered
moment of utopian optimism in the perverse anti-climax to the aggressive
build-up. After Geli Tripping casts her sexual magic to blind Tchitcherine to
all but her, he speaks with his brother Enzian on a bridge in a simple act of
bartering, with no awareness of their relation; “[c]ertainly not the first time
a  man  has  passed  his  brother  by,  at  the  edge  of  the  evening,  often
forever,  without knowing it”  (1995, 735).  The utopian element is  clear:
[SLIDE] “[t]his is magic. Sure – but not necessarily fantasy”. Thus, in one
small  corner  near  the  close  of  Gravity's  Rainbow,  the  critical  point  of
oscillation for “diagnosis: metamodern” is found; a redemption founded on
a non-fantastic, but nonetheless magical occurrence; love. The regulative
utopia,  pivoted  around  conventional  time,  enmeshed  in  eternity  and
reflexive stasis brings  Gravity's Rainbow  to the metamodern, for it is “a
spacetime that is  both-neither ordered and disordered” (Vermeulen and
van den Akker 2010). As the final rocket falls, the audience can carry on
as-if  it  did not; surely, like Tchitcherine, all will  be redeemed?  Gravity's
Rainbow  begins  by  stating  “it  is  too  late,”  only  to  end  with  a  more
optimistic, yet ironically infused, “there is still time”. Of course, this magic
was  only  possible  because  of  a  secret:  “[t]he  secret  is  in  the
concentrating” (Pynchon 1995, 734).
[SLIDE]
“[C]oncentrating intently on anything is very hard work,” as Wallace puts it (Wallace 1996, 203), 
but one of the aspects upon which Infinite Jest concentrates is the way in which “anhedonia and 
internal emptiness” are deemed “hip and cool” in the “millennial U.S.A.”; “hip ennui” (1996, 694) 
in which “there's some rule that real stuff can only get mentioned if everybody rolls their eyes or 
laughs in a way that isn't happy,” (1996, 592) an “absolution via irony” (1996, 385). Wallace also 
gives, for an analysis of the metamodern schema, a definition of naivety: “[s]entiment equals 
naivety on this continent,” the incompatibility of which with cynicism is merely a “queerly 
persistent U.S. myth” (1996, 694). The locus of cynicism and naivety in Wallace's earlier novel, 
which performs a similar function to the Tchitcherine narrative in Gravity's Rainbow, is perhaps 
best examined through Don Gately's experience in hospital after he is shot defending Randy Lenz. 
Consider, for instance, the bedside visit of Joelle van Dyne whose sympathy towards Gately is 
described, sentimentally, thus: “[h]e feels self-conscious with her, Joelle can tell, but what's 
admirable is he has no idea how heroic or even romantic he looks, unshaven and intubated, huge 
and helpless, wounded in service to somebody who did not deserve service” (1996, 855). However, 
the sentiment and naivety of this setup, re-enforced through Wallace's shift of internal perspective 
which reveals the characters' mutual uncommunicated attraction towards one another, is 
undermined in only the next paragraph, veering back towards cynicism, for “Joelle doesn't know 
that newly sober people are awfully vulnerable to the delusion that people with more sober time 
than them are romantic and heroic, instead of clueless and terrified and just muddling through day-
by-day”. 
The problem with Infinite Jest is that, as the novel metatextually remarks through James O. 
Incandenza's “Accomplice!”: “even though the cartridge's end has both characters emoting out of 
every pore, Accomplice!'s essential project remains abstract and self-reflexive; we end up feeling 
and thinking not about the characters, but about the cartridge [read: book] itself” (1996, 946). 
Consider, for instance, the missing year of the narrative that precedes the beginning and follows the 
novel's end and the additional level of indeterminacy this adds in terms of reflexivity upon 
representation. As a counterpoint to this, the elements of Wallace's novel indebted to literary realism
are supposed to demonstrate their distance from Accomplice!. Instead, Wallace's text seems, like 
Accomplice! to oscillate, a very metamodern term, between emotional empathy, realism, sympathy 
and a level of meta-speculation that is an unavoidable consequence of its experimental style. As The
Pale King puts it: “if you're there to look at the experiment, it supposedly messes up the results” 
(Wallace 2011, 482). The last question to ask, then, is: does “metamodernism” present itself, in light
of this study, as a better term, free of pejorative connotations, that can productively be used to 
group, and think about, the shared tropes of writing that appears distinct from its antecedent 
generic?
[SLIDE]
There is obviously a problem with metamodernism as it applies to the literary examples 
presented here. Gravity's Rainbow is considered to be an, if not the, archetype of postmodern 
writing, yet it has clearly been seen that it could also be categorised as metamodern. Infinite Jest, a 
supposed failed attempt, also demonstrates metamodernism to some degree. This is not to say that a 
work cannot fall under two classifications, but rather that if the classification simply forms an 
overlay for an extant generic, or is so broad as to exclude virtually no work, then it adds no value to 
a discussion; Borges' one-to-one map of the world, perhaps. Metamodernism is such a 
classification. Nonetheless, metamodernism does hold value, not as a generic classification, but as a
set of tropes that identify regulative utopianism through the dialectical image of a sincerity infused 
with naivety undermined by scepticism. This specific constellation could be called the 
“metamodern aspect” of a text.
Metamodernism as a reading practice provides a means to excavate
buried ethical connotations of supposedly nihilistic postmodern texts. In
the light of this, it is a tool for rethinking the millennial turning point for a
new literary ethics, examined here all too briefly in Pynchon and Wallace, a
tool that can help us deal with the compulsion, in the generic classification
of the ethics of fiction, [SLIDE] to go on.
